General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929 by Jan Karl Tanenbaum

Author:Jan Karl Tanenbaum [Tanenbaum, Jan Karl]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, France
ISBN: 9780807897935
Google: C43IYgEACAAJ
Publisher: University of North Carolina Press
Published: 2011-01-27T22:27:25+00:00

IX.Swing to the Right: Recall

I am completely indifferent about the Paix-[Séailles]-Mathieu Affair.…We must find something else for my enemies.

—SARRAIL to Jean Decrais, September 9, 1917

In September, 1917, Radical-Socialist Alfred Margaine informed Sarrail of two important points. First, the British had demanded that Sarrail be recalled.1 Margaine was correct, for on June 6, immediately following the May offensive, Lloyd George wrote to Premier Ribot that the British, Serbian, Russian, and Italian commanders at Salonika complained that in one way or another Sarrail’s recent offensive had been poorly planned and coordinated; consequently, Sarrail should be recalled.2

Although much of the criticism leveled against Sarrail’s management of the spring offensive was valid, it may have been that the attacks served as a convenient smoke screen for shortcomings to be found elsewhere. Certainly the Serbs who refused to leave their trenches had not distinguished themselves during the 1917 spring offensive. Nor had General Milne, although he was quick to suggest that the offensive had failed because Sarrail, in response to Paris’s frequent warnings that military operations against Greece were imminent, had kept two French divisions in reserve where they remained inactive during the entire offensive.3 It appears that the British commander had been plagued by the same self-doubts and brooding pessimism that had characterized his performance during the 1916 offensive. His uninspired and lackluster leadership during the May offensive led naval Captain Alfred Stead to observe: “[Milne] shelters himself behind the orders he receives from Sarrail with whom he has not even tried to cooperate. Before commencing the offensive he said that the task allotted to him was impossible—result thousands of casualties. He regards the whole expedition as a fiasco and his only desire is to clear out of the country.”4

On June 7 the Ribot government discussed Lloyd George’s request; once again, Poincaré recorded, it was “the eternal Sarrail question.” Not surprisingly, it was Painlevé who defended Sarrail from London’s criticism. The war minister emphasized that an army composed of several nationalities always posed exceptional difficulties for its commander and Sarrail’s Eastern Army was no exception. Ribot, on the other hand, was sympathetic to England’s recommendations.5 Nevertheless, the premier had to reject Lloyd George’s request because, as Painlevé cautioned London, if Sarrail were recalled, “it would bring down the Ribot government with a crash—and the Alliance with it.”6 London did not forget Painlevé’s warning. Two months later when the War Cabinet again seriously considered requesting that Sarrail be removed, it refrained from presenting its demand to Paris, fearing that the Ribot government could not recall Sarrail without becoming involved in a serious political crisis—one that could possibly result in the fall of the French government.7 Robertson was correct when he complained that as long as Painlevé held a Cabinet position, Sarrail would not be ignominiously sacked.8

Second, Margaine informed Sarrail that the general’s political supporters were disappointed that with Painlevé’s advent to power as war minister and then as premier in September, Sarrail had not been given a prominent position on the Western front, possibly as commander of a combined Franco-American army.

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